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ZONING: A REBUTTAL TO "VILLAGE OF
EUCLID MEETS AGUA CALIENTE"
Carl Bryant Rogers*
The impetus for this note is an article by Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr.,'
which argues the case for the enforcement 2 of state authorized zoning
laws on Indian reservations.
3
Reynolds' general conclusion is that
[T]he federal government, to the extent it still supervises Indian
reservations, and the states, to the extent they increasingly assume
such control, should treat the reservation government as a munici-
pal entity that can speak for its residents.4
A prior statement of this conclusion, keyed more directly to the
zoning issue is that:
(a) . . . "municipal" treatment can be given the reservation
tribes, with the state or regional agency setting the basic standards
and adopting the overall plan, and... reservations (at least where
they indicate a willingness to act, and set up an agency to do so)
determining classifications of specific properties and enforcing
the laws.5
Reynolds' conclusion rests on a number of erroneous propositions as
regards the "reservation zoning issue," and obscures the fundamental
questions of (a) whether state police power may be exercised over
reservation land at all, and (b) whether this power includes authority
to impose and enforce a zoning ordinance on reservation land. This
note will argue that exemption of on-reservation land-use conduct
from the application or enforcement of state authorized zoning
ordinances is mandated by the unique status of Indian tribes under
federal law. The argument will focus on rebuttal of the propositions
which underlie Reynolds' analysis.
Rebuttal of Reynolds' Argument
Underlying Reynolds' analysis are three propositions which speak
to the relationship between states, political subdivisions of states,
tribes, and the federal government vis a vis their respective authority
* Law Student, Harvard Law School. B.A., Mississippi State; former Coordinator of
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to regulate the land-use conduct of Indians and non-Indians on
reservation lands.
The first of these propositions is that current trends in congres-
sional policy favor a relinquishment of federal control over reserva-
tions and a transfer of that control "to the states, not the tribes."'
The primary sources from which Reynolds derives this proposition
are Public Law 83-28o7 and Public Law 9o-284.8 These acts clearly
do indicate a change in congressional policy in respect to American
Indians and tribal-state-federal relations, but the trend which they
represent is the converse of that asserted by Reynolds.
Congressional policy with regard to Indian affairs has reversed
itself just about every twenty years since the Civil WarY Generally,
Congress has alternatively embraced and rejected a "termination/as-
similation"'1 policy and a "tribal self-government/preservation of
Indian identity" policy."' Public Law 83-28o is without question
a termination act'- and it has been so characterized by the Secretary
of the Interior." The dual aims of the Act as stated by the House
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, to whom the Act was
referred, were "first, withdrawal of Federal responsibility for Indian
affairs wherever practicable; and second, termination of the subjec-
tion of Indians to Federal laws applicable to Indians as such.1 14
This language was incorporated into the report of the Senate Com-
mittee on Interior and Insular Affairs recommending passage of
the Act.15
Public Law 83-.28o was passed just two weeks after the Senate
adopted House Concurrent Resolution No. Lo8, which enunciated
Congress' determination to bring about a termination of federal
responsibility to Indians.16
On the other hand, Public Law 90-284 (1968) clearly represents a
return by Congress to the "pro-tribal self-government/preservation
of Indian identity" policy and a rejection of the termination approach
to Indian affairs.' 7
Even a cursory review of these acts will demonstrate Reynolds'
error. The effect of Public Law 83-28o was
(a) to confer on California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon and
Wisconsin civil and criminal jurisdiction 8 over certain, tribes and
Indian lands within their borders;20
(b) to give consent of the United States to states which were
admitted to the Union under enabling acts containing disclaimers
of jurisdiction over reservation lands2' and whose present constitu-
tions disclaimed such jurisdiction, to repeal such disclaimers by
constitutional amendment and to assert jurisdiction under the Act;22
and
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(c) to give consent to all other states to acquire civil and criminal
jurisdiction over reservation lands by affirmative legislative action
whenever a state should desire to do so.23
In contrast, Title IV of Public Law 9o-284 repealed the key opera-
tive section of Public Law 83-28o to provide that states which had
not already done so could in the future acquire civil and criminal
jurisdiction over reservations "only after acquiring the consent of
the tribes in the states by referendum of all reservated Indians. 24
The Supreme Court has made it clear in Kennerly v. District Court5
and McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Commission26 that states which
desire to acquire such jurisdiction and tribes which choose to accept
state jurisdiction must follow to the letter the procedure established
by Congress in Public Laws 83-28o and 9o-:8427 or else no state
jurisdiction will be recognized.28
Similarly, Title II of Public Law 9o-284 enacted a statutory "Bill
of Rights" designed to afford certain basic rights of a "constitutional"
nature to persons affected by "an Indian tribe in exercising its powers
of self-government.129 This title clearly expressed congressional rec-
ognition of and commitment to the continuing exercise of powers of
self-government by Indian tribes, 30 a notion which is flatly inconsis-
tent with the termination policy underlying Public Law 83-28o.
Aside from the acts themselves, Reynolds invokes only one other
authority, a Harvard Law Review note,3' to sustain his reading of
the trend in congressional policy evidenced by Public Law 83-28o
and Public Law 90-z84. That note does not support Reynolds'
interpretation. 2
The second proposition underlying Reynolds' analysis is that
"Indian tribes retain little governmental authority and derive what
powers they do have by delegation from the states and the federal
government.133 This proposition flies in the face of settled priniciples
of federal law with respect to the source and status of tribal govern-
ment powers. The basic framework remains as described by Felix
Cohen: "Those powers which are lawfully vested in an Indian tribe
are not, in general, delegated powers granted by express acts of Con-
gress, but rather inherent powers of a limited sovereignty which has
never been extingnished.1134 This framework derives from Chief
Justice Marshall's landmark decision in Worcester v. Georgia5 in
which the Court held that Indian tribes were ". . . distinct political
communities having territorial boundaries, within which their au-
thority is exclusive .... ,,31
The Supreme Court has consistently reaffirmed this basic frame-
work. In Williams v. Lee,37 the Court held that Arizona courts had
no jurisdiction to hear a civil action brought by a non-Indian against
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an Indian arising from an on-reservation transaction, and stated that
the broad principles of Worcester v. Georgia continued to be ac-
cepted as law, except that the Court had "modified these principles
in cases where essential tribal relations were not involved and where
the rights of Indians would not be jeopardized." 8 The Court went
on to affirm the "right of reservation Indians to make their own laws
and be ruled by them;.. ."" and stated:
There can be no doubt that to allow the exercise of state juris-
diction here would infringe on the right of the Indians to govern
themselves. It is immaterial that respondent is not an Indian. He
was on the Reservation and the transaction with an Indian took
place there.... The cases in this Court have consistently guarded
the authority of Indian governments over their reservations.
40
In McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Commission4 the Court reiterated
the view originally expressed in United States v. Kagama42 that
Indian tribes were, and always have been, regarded as having a
semi-independent position when they preserved their tribal rela-
tions; not as States, not as nations, not as possessed of the full
attributes of sovereignty, but as a separate people, with the power
of regulating their internal and social relations, and thus far not
brought under the laws of the Union or of the State within whose
limits they resided.4
In United States v. Mazurie,44 the Court upheld a federal prosecu-
tion of a non-Indian for violation of a tribal ordinance regulating
liquor sales as applied to the sale of alcoholic beverages from a plot of
fee patented land located within the external boundaries of the Wind
River Reservation. The Court stated that ". . . Indian tribes are
unique aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both
their members and their territory.... [T]hey are a separate people
possessing the power of regulating their internal and social rela-
tions .... ", The Court reversed the Tenth Circuit on the ground
that the tribe's preexisting police power jurisdiction to regulate the
conduct of non-Indians within its reservation by enactment of regula-
tory ordinances validated Congress' delegation of local responsibility
for liquor sales regulation to the tribe.
40
Numerous lower federal court decisions reaffirm the status of
Indian tribes as "distinct political communities" retaining powers
of self-government except as such powers have been expressly abro-
gated by treaty or act of Congress.47 In the face of these authorities,
which predate his article, Reynolds' references-three journal arti-
cles, 8 the 1973 Tenth Circuit decision in United States v. Mazurie,40
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and the Indian Reorganization AcI°--do not support his view51 that
"Indian tribes retain little governmental authority and derive what
powers they do have by delegation from the states and the federal
government."5 2 Neither the Oliver 3 nor Mundt5 4 articles disavow the
basic principles of federal Indian law set out supra, and the Mazurie
decision was reversed in 1975.5G
Reynolds' reliance on the Indian Reorganization Act to support
the proposition that tribal powers of self-government are in decline
is also misplaced. The purpose of the Act was to create a scheme by
which the recognition and exercise of tribal government powers
could be facilitated.50 Reynolds' interpretation of the Act as some-
how curtailing the powers of tribes which choose to organize under
its provisions may be rooted in his apparent misreading of note 29 in
the Schaab article.
5 7
Reynolds also errs when he asserts that tribes organized under
the IRA have only those powers "found in a constitution approved
by the Secretary of the Interior"' 58 and that IRA tribes enjoy more
limited internal sovereignty than non-IRA tribes.59 In fact, the IRA
expressly recognizes that tribes which choose to organize under its
provisions retain all powers of sovereignty which they possessed under
existing law prior to such reorganization under the IRA. The Act
accords those residual powers of sovereignty statutory recognition
and confers certain specified rights and powers on tribes which
invoke its provisions.60
Accordingly, tribes whose existences were recognized by the fed-
eral government prior to their reorganization under the IRA"' may
arguably be said to enjoy more limited internal sovereignty than
non-IRA tribes only to the degree to which the exercise of any of the
powers conferred by the IRA is subject to veto by the Secretary of
the Interior. Furthermore, whether the Secretary of the Interior's
power to approve or disapprove certain actions by IRA tribes presents
any greater impediment to the free exercise of such tribes' govern-
mental powers as compared to the non-IRA tribes is open to serious
question.62
Another error implicit in Reynolds' argument is the assertion
that the powers conferred by the IRA can only be obtained by a
tribe which adopts a constitution and secures a federal (corporate)
charter under its provisions. 3 There is nothing in the Act requiring
tribes that organize under Section 476 (which provides for the adop-
tion of a tribal constitution)6 4 also to secure a federal corporate
charter under Section 477.65 The two sections are clearly independent
and most tribes have chosen not to incorporate under Section 477.68
Reynolds quotes from Schaab that "[t]he ordinary municipal cor-
145
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poration has far more freedom of action than a tribal council under
its constitution. 67 The context in which this sentence appears in
note 29 of the Schaab article suggests that Schaab meant this judg-
ment to apply only to IRA-organized tribes which had also incor-
porated under Section 477 of the Act. When thus limited, Schaab's
observation has a great deal of practical truth-it is very difficult to
act when major decisions must be approved by both a corporate
board of directors (required under Section 477) and a tribal council
(required by Section 476). However, only a few tribes have invoked
both Sections 476 and 477 of the IRA. 8 Even as to those tribes which
are so organized, the fact that they may labor under practical impedi-
ments to the exercise of their governmental powers in no way der-
ogates from the existence of such powers.09
More significantly, the claim that such tribes (Reynolds apparently
makes the broader claim that these limitations apply to all tribes)
may be less free to exercise their governmental powers than the "ordi-
nary municipal corporation" does not speak to the more fundamental
question of how the power of a municipal corporation to unilaterally
initiate the zoning of land within its jurisdiction compares to the
power of a tribe to do so.
An answer to this question is readily available. A municipality
(whether or not it is incorporated) has no inherent police power
sufficient to authorize the zoning of land within its jurisdiction .7
On the other hand, the inherent police power jurisdiction of tribal
governments over reservation land and persons on reservation land
is well settled. 1 That such police power includes the authority to
zone reservation lands, consistent with federal law, seems equally
clear.7
2
In Cowan v. Rosebud Sioux Tribal Court,78 involving the question
of whether the Rosebud Sioux Tribe's police power extended to the
regulation of land use by enforcing terms in lease contracts against
non-Indian lessees, the court stated:
... [T]he matter of use and regulation of tribal lands is a matter
of tribal self-government and thus one properly left to the jurisdic-
tion of tribal court[s].
The regulation of tribal property would seem to be one of the
vestiges of tribal sovereignty and thus a matter of tribal self-
government. Unquestionably a tribal government retains the
powers of sovereignty over its land when those powers have not
been specifically removed by Congress .... The fact that plaintiffs
herein are not members of the Rosebud Sioux Tribe does not re-
move the jurisdiction of the Tribal Court over matters involving
the use of tribal land.
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While Cowan is not a reservation zoning case, the court's argu-
ment with regard to the scope of tribal police power in respect to
reservation land-use regulation speaks directly to the question of
whether a tribe may zone reservation land. Reynolds seems to con-
cede that zoning of reservation land is within the power of tribal
governments when he states, "... . zoning... is comparable to taxa-
tion, grazing control, and hunting and fishing licensing-powers that
have.., often been recognized in the tribal governments."'74
The Cowan decision, when read in conjunction with Williams v.
Lee7 Olliphant v. Schlie7 Belgarde v. Morton,77 Quechan Tribe v.
Rowe,7 8 Ortiz-Barraza v. United States,79 United States v. Mazurie,80
and language in Fisher v. District Court,81 would suggest resolution
of the issue of whether tribes may today assert regulatory authority
to enforce a zoning ordinance over all persons within their territory
(Indian or non-Indian) in favor of the tribes. This result follows
without difficulty"2 if one accepts the continuing validity of the
Cohen framework:
So long as the complete and independent sovereignty of an
Indian tribe was recognized, its criminal jurisdiction, no less than
its civil jurisdiction, was that of any sovereign .... It might punish
aliens within its jurisdiction according to its laws and customs.
Such jurisdiction continues to this day, save as it has been expressly
limited by the acts of a superior government.
8 3
In Fisher v. District Court, the Supreme Court upheld the North-
ern Cheyenne Tribe's assertion of exclusive jurisdiction over adop-
tion proceedings involving a tribal member living on the reservation.
Although this dispute involved no non-Indian parties, the Court
unequivocally expressed the view that tribal jurisdiction is territori-
ally based and not keyed to the race or tribal membership of the
parties involved:
Since the adoption proceeding is appropriately characterized as
litigation arising on the Indian reservation, the jurisdiction of the
tribal court is exclusive.
8 4
Finally, we reject the argument that denying respondent access
to the Montana Courts constitutes impermissible racial discrimi-
nation. The exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribal Court does not
derive from the race of the Plaintiff but rather from the quasi-
sovereign status of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe under Federal
Law."
9
The third proposition which underlies Reynolds' argument is that
"States may currently exercise police power over federal Indian reser-
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vations."86 To support this position, Reynolds cites to Kane87 who
states that reservation land "has always been held to be 'within the
political and governmental boundaries of the state' and consequently
under the sovereignty of the state and the control of its laws."'88 Kane
invokes two lines of authority to support this contention. The first is a
series of Arizona cases which do not address the question at issue:
whether the state of Arizona may extend its police power jurisdiction
over reservation land: Porter v. Hail8 9 (Indians on reservations are
residents of Arizona for voting purposes, but are "persons under
guardianship" within the meaning of exception in the Arizona con-
stitution restricting right to vote to persons not "under guardian-
ship"); Harrison Y. Laveen ° (Indians on reservations are not "per-
sons under guardianship" within the meaning of the Arizona consti-
tution); and Begay v. Miller9' (Arizona courts will recognize divorce
decrees granted by Navaho tribal courts).
The first two of these cases, and the erroneous quid pro quo9 2
analysis which Kane would have to have undertaken in order to view
them as authority for the extension of state jurisdiction over reserva-
tion land, illustrate one of the more common mistakes to which
those not schooled in "Indian law" may fall victim. In a nutshell,
the quid pro quo analysis suggests that if a reservation Indian is en-
titled to the benefits of state citizenship (e.g., right to vote, to attend
school, to attend state university at state resident tuition rates, etc.),
then he "ought to be" or (as some would argue) "is" subject to the
burdens of state citizenship (e.g., obligation to pay state taxes, to
submit to state laws, etc.)
There are a number of problems with this simplistic argument,
among which are the facts that it ignores the unique legal-political
status accorded Indian tribes by the Constitution93 and it is at war
with the basic principles underlying modem federal Indian law.'
The argument also fails to consider that many tribes were guaranteed
exemption from the imposition of such burdens by treaty, 5 that
many states were required to disclaim jurisdiction over Indian lands
as a precondition to their entrance into the Union,90 that subjecting
reservation Indians to state law would require them to answer to
three (or possibly four or five) levels of government, and that most
reservation Indians have (by their very presence) manifested a prefer-
ence for life under tribal/federal jurisdiction instead of state/federal
jurisdiction.
These observations beg a number of obvious questions and raise
several policy issues, which are analogous to those underlying Con-
gress' cyclical swings in federal Indian policy. The Supreme Court's
answer to this argument and to the above referenced Arizona case law
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was announced in Mc~lanahan v. Arizona Tax Commission97 where
the Court held that with respect to the Navaho reservation, "... the
state is totally lacking in jurisdiction over both the people and the
lands...."18 The Court went on to restate the general rule that "state
laws do not apply to tribal Indians on Indian reservations except
when Congress has expressly provided that state law shall apply."9
While McClanahan may turn to some extent on the content of
treaties between the United States and the Navaho Nation, and the
doctrine of tribal sovereignty, 100 the Court made it clear' 01 that the
failure of the state to formally acquire jurisdiction over the Navaho
reservation, in accord with the procedure established by Congress in
Public Laws 83-28o and 9o-284, was itself sufficient to rebut the
state's claim of jurisdiction.
This alternative basis for the McClanahan decision rests on the
theory that states may not assert jurisdiction'02 over territory within
the borders of a reservation without prior federal consent, which can,
in general, be obtained only by compliance with "a governing act of
Congress."
The phrase, "governing act of Congress," is taken from an earlier
test for deciding jurisdictional conflicts between states and tribes
announced in Williams v. Lee: "Essentially, absent governing acts
of Congress, the question has always been whether [a state] action
infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws
and be ruled by them.' 0 3
By labeling Public Law 83-28o, as amended, "a governing act of
Congress," McClanahan reduces the Williams v. Lee test to an
empty formula as applied to state-tribal power clashes vis-a-vis the
regulation of on-reservation activities, where the outcome in a given
case turns solely on whether the state has formally acquired jurisdic-
tion under Public Law 83-28o.Y°4 If the answer to this question is no,
the state has no jurisdiction. If yes, there follows an additional level
of analysis which looks to the status of tribal governments under
state law as envisioned by the relevant federal policy and shaped by
the degree to which the basic framework of federal Indian law re-
mains applicable. 0 5
In recognition of the above, the courts since McClanahan have
consistently denied state jurisdiction over reservation lands where
the state has not acquired jurisdiction through the Public Laws
83-28o/9o-z84 procedure or comparable act of Congress' 6
Given these decisions, no state which has not acquired such juris-
diction over a given reservation can today successfully assert the
power to zone that reservation.
The second line of cases which Kane invokes to support the conten-
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tion that state laws may be enforced on reservation lands consists of
United States v. Minnesota'0 7 (Minnesota may not acquire highway
right-of-way over reservation land by eminent domain) and Utah
Power 6 Light Co. v. United States'"8 (state laws, including those
relating to the power of eminent domain, have no application to
United States forest lands except as they have been adopted or made
applicable by Congress). These cases simply do not stand for the
principle for which they were cited. 09 Also, the rules of substantive
law applicable to "public lands" (such as the forest lands involved
in the Utah Power case) are not synonymous to those applicable to
reservation lands, and the differences cut against rather than for state
claims to jurisdiction.1 0
Further, the Utah Power case makes it clear that where Congress
has exercised its power with respect to land in which it has an interest
(such as tribal trust land), neither a state nor any of its agencies has
power to interfere because Congress has preempted the field."' That
Congress, as contrasted with the states, has preempted the field as
regards Indians affairs and the regulation of the use and disposition
of tribal property and lands is hardly open to question at this late
date.
Reynolds' view that states have traditionally possessed broad police
powers over the land within their borders apparently also relies on
Kane. It is of interest that Kane, in the same article quoted by
Reynolds, states that "a state court without Federal authorization
may not enforce its decrees within an Indian reservation," 2 and
that "25 U.S.C. § 23111 seems to be a clear indication of Congres-
sional intent that other types of state officials are prohibited from
entering Indian reservations to enforce state laws without tribal
consent or Federal statutory authority to do so.""11
4
Reynolds' view of the necessity of state regulation of reservation
land to achieve regional planning objectives is attributed to an Ari-
zona Law Review note"15 where the language referenced by Reynolds
refutes the very contention for which the article was cited:
Logically, legislative designs for improvement of the health,
education and welfare of the community can hardly be effective
where a large contiguous area and population is not subject to
regulation. Yet, Indian communities are not subject to state zoning
regulation and, in fact, often have conflicting rules. 01
Reynolds' belief in the paramount authority of a state to prevent
environmental damage is also unsupported. He cites only Depart-
ment of Game v. Puyallup Tribe. 7 This case addressed the issue of
how to resolve a conflict between state police power regulation and
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tribal treaty rights as regards off-reservation fishing,"" and the dicta" 9
for which Reynolds cites the case is not authority for the contention
that a state may exercise its police power over reservation lands-
even to forestall environmentally offensive conduct.
Reynolds has not made a case for the proposition that states may
exercise police power jurisdiction to regulate the land-use conduct
of persons on reservation lands by zoning in the absence of an
express grant of such jurisdiction by Congress. This leaves the
regulation of reservation land-use in the hands of the federal and
tribal governments.
There remains the issue of whether those few states which have
validly acquired general civil or criminal jurisdiction over reservation
land may zone such land. This issue will be explored in the following
section.
The Reservation Zoning Cases2 °
Reynolds observes that "[a]fter the.., federal legislation [Public
Law 83-28o] giving some states civil jurisdiction over Indian lands,
the possibility became stronger that, within the limits of the legisla-
tion, the state and its localities could zone the reservation."''
Although Reynolds' article focuses on Agua Caliente Band of
Mission Indians Tribal Council v. City of Palm Springs, 122 the first
case to address the issue of whether any limits to state jurisdiction
obtained under Public Law 83-28o might bar the enforcement of a
state authorized zoning ordinance on reservation land is Snohomish
County v. Seattle Disposal Co. 123 In Snohomish the Supreme Court
of Washington held that a county zoning ordinance was not enforce-
able in a civil action against a non-Indian lessee operating a garbage
dump on reservation land on the ground that enforcement of the
ordinance would, in effect, impose an "encumbrance" on the reserva-
tion land, and was, therefore, prohibited by the Public Law 83-28o
savings clause.
24
The majority, relying primarily on Squire v. Capoeman,2 5 argued
that application of a zoning ordinance to reservation land, so as to
prohibit or limit the use to which that land could be put, would
reduce its value and thereby constitute an "encumbrance" on the
land within the meaning of Public Law 8 3-z8o.2 This interpretation
has come to be termed the expansive view of the "encumbrance"
clause 127 and reflects recognition of the current policy of furthering
tribal self-government. 28 Judge Hale's dissent, in contrast, has been
termed the "narrow" view of the "encumbrance" clause. 29
The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Snohomish with Justices
151
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Douglas and White dissenting.1 0 The dissenting justices endorsed
Judge Hale's view that a county zoning ordinance as applied to a
non-Indian lessee would not constitute an encumbrance on reserva-
tion land, and indicated support for Judge Hale's argument that
Indian immunity should not be allowed to frustrate state efforts
to curb air and water pollution.13' The dissenting opinion also argued
that it was an important federal question whether the state of Wash-
ington might already prohibit the spread of smoke from an on-
reservation garbage dump through jurisdiction which might be con-
ferred under Section 231 of Title 25 of the United States Code
(197o).132
Finally, the dissenting justices noted that to the degree that Sec-
tion 1.4 of Title 25 of the Code of Federal Regulations (which pro-
hibits the enforcement of state land-use regulations on reservation
lands leased to non-Indians or Indians) might be found to infringe
on the state jurisdiction conferred by Public Law 83-28o and Section
231, a federal question was presented which cast doubt on the validity
of Section 1.4"13'
Significantly, the question of whether a county zoning ordinance
authorized by state law is encompassed within the state grant of
authority as to civil actions arising in Indian country3 4 was not
addressed in Snohomish at any stage. The Washington court and
dissenting Justices Douglas and White apparently assumed that
county ordinances were to be accorded the same treatment as state
laws of general application under the statute. 35
Subsequent to the denial of certiorari in Snohomish, a number of
federal district court decisions addressing the "reservation zoning
issue" as regards Public Law 83-280 states (or the analogous question
of whether state or local police power regulations which affect
reservation land-use could be enforced on Public Law 8 3-28o reserva-
tions) were announced.'3 6 Each of these decisions adopted the
"narrow" view of the "encumbrance" clause and relied heavily on the
assimilationist character of Public Law 83-28o"17 to support the view
that Congress had intended by the Act to subject reservation Indians
to state law as extensively as possible consistent with the "narrow"
limits to state jurisdiction which they found in the savings clause. By
and large, all of these cases tracked the Snohomish dissents of Judge
Hale and Justices Douglas and White on this point.
Of the reported decisions, only Rincon (cited at note 136) ad-
dressed the issue of whether county (penal) ordinances should be
held to be "criminal laws" of a state within the meaning of Section
116z (a) of Title 18 of the United States Code. 38 The court answered
this question in the affirmative, relying largely on California case
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law"'8 and the unreported decision of Madrigal (cited at note 136),
which had found that a county rock festival regulatory (criminal)
ordinance was a criminal law of the state within the meaning of
Public Law 83-z8o.14
°
In Rincon the Court, again relying on Madrigal and continuing to
track the Snohomish dissent of Justices Douglas and White, also held
that "[25 C.F.R.] § 1.4 was void insofar as it purports to enlarge or
restrict the scope of jurisdiction afforded by Public Law 28o."'141 This
result was reached to meet the tribe's argument that to enforce the
challenged ordinance on the Rincon reservation would be inconsis-
tent with Section 1.4 and, therefore, such enforcement was barred
by the second part of the savings clause in Section 116z(b), which
prohibits state regulation of reservation land "in a manner inconsis-
tent with any federal treaty, agreement or statute or with any regula-
tion made pursuant thereto."'1 42
Three years later in Norvell (cited in note 136), the Federal
District Court of New Mexico relied on Rincon to hold again that
Section 1.4 was invalid to the degree that it conflicted with jurisdic-
tion conferred on states under Public Law 83-z8o, thereby autho-
rizing enforcement of state land-use regulations against a non-Indian-
owned corporation operating on leased reservation land. 4 3
Given the above, it is perhaps understandable why Reynolds
should assert that the Agua Caliente decision had ". . . adopted what
seems the majority and stronger view-'encumbrance' means some
burden on alienability, not merely an encumbrance on use. This is
in line with authority that 'encumbrance' does not cover an exercise
of the police power....
No sooner had Reynolds' article been set to print than were
Madrigal, Ricci, Rincon, Agua Caliente, and Norvell reversed-
each on grounds other than the merits.' 45 At that juncture (as of
January, 1975), the only reported case that had addressed the en-
cumbrance issue and which had not been reversed was the Snohomish
decision of the Supreme Court of Washington, which had adopted
the "expansive" view of the encumbrance clause. 46 Because it seems
clear that the Snohomish (Washington) majority would have held
contra to each of the federal district court decisions discussed supra,
and because none of these cases had been reversed on the merits, the
state of the law on this issue after eight years of litigation was less
clear than before the Snohomish decisions had been announced
in 1967.
Similarly, because there had been no decisions contra (1) to the
Rincon 47 holding that county ordinances should be treated as state
laws under Public Law 83-z8o, and (2) to the Rincon and Norvell 48
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holdings that z5 C.F.R. § 1.4 was invalid to the degree that it was
inconsistent with state jurisdiction (which these decisions had held
to be conferred by i8 U.S.C. § 1162), these questions were also
unresolved.
Each of these issues was recently addressed in an unreported (as of
yet) Ninth Circuit decision in Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings
County.149 In Santa Rosa, the court focused on the question of
whether a state-authorized county zoning ordinance and building
code can be applied and enforced on a reservation over which a state
has acquired civil and criminal jurisdiction under Public Law 83-280
so as to regulate Indian use of Indian trust lands. The court's answer
to this question is a firm and unequivical "no."
The Santa Rosa decision5 ° articulated four distinct bases for its
denial of state power to authorize the enforcement of a county zoning
ordinance on Public Law 83-280 reservations.' 5'
(i) Since County ordinances are not "civil laws of the state that
are of general application within the state" within the meaning of
28 U.S.C. § 136o (b), such ordinances cannot be applied to reserva-
tions pursuant to jurisdiction acquired thereunder.
(2) Even if county zoning ordinances were held to be "civil laws
of the state," such ordinances are not enforceable on reservation
land since such enforcement is prohibited by 25 C.F.R. § 1.4
(barring application of state land-use regulations to leased reserva-
tion land), which is a reasonable and valid regulation enacted
pursuant to the Secretary of the Interior's statutory authority, and
may (alternatively) be justified as an administrative interpretation
of the term "encumbrance" in 28 U.S.C. § 136o(b).
(3) An ordinance regulating reservation land-use conduct con-
stitutes an encumbrance on such land and is prohibited by z8
U.S.C. § 136o(b).
(4) Application of the ordinance on the facts of this case is
prohibited by 28 U.S.C. § i 36o (b) since the ordinance interferes
with Federal efforts to upgrade reservation housing and sanitary
conditions.
The Santa Rosa decision reflects the Ninth Circuit's belief (even
given Public Law 83-28o) in the continued vitality of certain basic
principles of federal Indian law which it considered and affirmed in
the context of the factual situation before it: the notion of federal
preemption of the regulation of reservation land; 52 the principle that
ambiguities in statutes affecting Indian rights should be resolved in
favor of the Indians;'5" the right of reservation Indians to be self-
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governing;' " and (consistent with federal law and policy) to control
the development of reservation resources;' 55 the principle that states
have no inherent police power jurisdiction over reservations and can
exercise only such jurisdiction over reservations as the federal govern-
ment grants them; 56 the doctrine of inherent tribal sovereignty as a
basis for tribal self-determination. 5
7
On the role of tribal governments under Public Law 83-z8o juris-
diction, the court stated:
[E]xtension of local jurisdiction is inconsistent with tribal self-
determination and autonomy.
5 8
We think it more plausible that Congress had in mind a distri-
bution of jurisdiction which would make the tribal government
over the reservation more or less the equivalent of a county or
local government in other areas of the state, empowered subject
to the paramount provisions of state law, to regulate matters of
local concern within the areas of its jurisdiction. 59
After Santa Rosa, assuming it is not overturned, no state within
the Ninth Circuit can, if challenged, successfully assert the authority
to zone reservation land even if it has acquired Public Law 83-280
jurisdiction, whether or not it does so directly or through a state-
authorized local zoning ordinance. Furthermore, although the court
emphasized at the outset of its decision, "that this suit involves an
attempt to regulate Indian land use of Indian trust lands,"'6 the
various rationales offered to prohibit enforcement of a county zoning
ordinance on reservation land apply with equal force to prohibit state
regulation of non-Indian as well as of Indian land users of land falling
within the territorial jurisdiction of tribal governments.16' It also
seems clear6 2 that the Ninth Circuit would treat "penal" zoning
ordinances (which authorize criminal sanctions) sought to be en-
forced against on-reservation land users pursuant to state criminal
jurisdiction acquired under 38 U.S.C. § 1162,163 just as it did the
"civil" zoning ordinance in Santa Rosa, which the state argued was
enforceable against reservation land users via state civil jurisdiction
acquired under 28 U.S.C. § 136o"64
Three additional points should be noted. The first is that the
federal courts have consistently interpreted the savings clause in
18 U.S.C. § 116z(b) 65 so as to prohibit state regulation of tribal
rights such as the right to hunt, fish, or trap (on or off the reserva-
tion) 66 or to regulate such activities on the reservation, 6 7 where
such rights are recognized by federal treaty, agreement, or statute.
This question was not considered in any of the cases discussed above.
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The second point is that the Tenth Circuit has held in Davis v.
IVorton 168 that the leasing of reservation land (which requires fed-
eral approval) constitutes major federal action within the meaning
of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),"° and accord-
ingly, that NEPA regulations must be complied with before such a
lease can be consummated. While the Davis holding would not
require all leases of reservation land to comply with NEPA, e.g., as
in the leasing of three acres to an Indian family as a garden plot,
170
it is clear that major leases of the type there involved (a 99-year lease
of 5,40o acres of land sufficient to support development of a com-
munity of i 5,ooo persons), and comparable leases to potentially
polluting industrial developers, are covered.Y
Accordingly, Davis somewhat diffuses the "environmentalist"
argument that state zoning authority is necessary to protect state
citizens and the off-reservation environment from reservation-based,
environmentally offensive activities. It should also be noted that
reservation Indians themselves have an obvious stake in preserving
the environment in which they live, and that Indian tribes have a
history of according respect to the environment which long preexists
that of even the most well-established non-Indian environmental
protection organizations. 72
Finally, securing a general resolution of the "reservation zoning
issue" along the lines suggested by Santa Rosa has more important
implications for the future of tribal governmental authority to con-
trol reservation development efforts in Public Law 83-280 states than
might be suggested by Reynold's analysis of the issue. This is because
Reynolds' analysis proceeds on the unstated premise that what one
means by zoning is "static districting or platting of lands.' 7 The
stakes riding on resolution of the reservation zoning issue are obvi-
ously much higher to both the states and the tribes when one
openly acknowledges that "zoning as platting" is only one of the
many land-use regulatory tools now available to a governmental
entity having police power jurisdiction over a given land area, 74 and
that an affirmative answer to the question of whether states can
zone reservation land is likely to be simply a prelude to state (or
non-Indian environmentalists) attempts to assert control over the
development of mineral resources, water, gas and oil, etc., on
reservations.
7 5
Reynolds undoubtedly recognizes this, but his analysis obscures
more than clarifies the bridge between state power to zone reservation
land, state power to control the development and use of other
reservation resources, and state (or non-Indian) desires to secure
control over such resources. 76
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Conclusion
The basic question which Reynolds addresses is whether a state
may authorize the zoning of federal Indian reservation land. Al-
though Reynolds ultimately suggests that tribal governments ought
to be treated as municipalities as regards the power to enact local
zoning ordinances, this suggestion rests on the prior conclusion that
states do have authority to regulate land-use conduct on reservations.
That conclusion is erroneous.
In accord with the fundamental principles of federal Indian law,
principally the doctrines of inherent tribal sovereignty and the
plenary power of Congress over Indian affairs, states are prohibited
from zoning reservation land absent express congressional authoriza-
tion to do so. After the Santa Rosa decision, so long as it is not
reversed by the United States Supreme Court, no state affected
thereby can successfully claim that Public Law 83-28o grants the
requisite federal authorization to zone reservation land, either di-
rectly or through the enactment of local zoning ordinances.
If reservations are to be zoned, it lies with the tribal governments
or the federal government to zone them. The unfortunate record of
the federal government in looking out for the interests of American
Indians, the current federal policy of Indian self-determination, and
the desire of reservation Indians to be self-governing argue for leaving
determination of the reservation zoning issue in the hands of tribal
governments.
Two recent expressions of federal policy would seem to mandate
this resolution of the issue. In 1970, President Richard M. Nixon
called for formal establishment of the principle of Indian self-deter-
mination as federal policy:
It is long past time that the Indian policies of the Federal
Government began to recognize and build upon the capacities and
insights of the Indian people. Both as a matter of justice and as a
matter of enlightened social policy, we must begin to act on the
basis of what the Indians themselves have long been telling us.
The time has come to break decisively with the past and to create
the conditions for a new era in which the Indian future is deter-
mined by Indian acts and Indian decisions.7 '
President Nixon's call for a federal commitment to the principle of
Indian self-determination has been answered by Congress:
The Congress declares its commitment to the maintenance of
the Federal Government's unique and continuing relationship
with and responsibility to the Indian people through the establish-
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ment of a meaningful Indian self-determination policy which will
permit an orderly transition from Federal domination of programs
for and services to Indians to effective and meaningful participa-
tion by the Indian people in the planning, conduct, and adminis-
tration of those programs and services.1
78
Proper recognition of Indian tribes as governments requires that
they-not states, nor municipalities, nor county governments, nor
even the federal government-decide, on consideration of the costs
and benefits as measured by the values of tribal members resident on
their reservations, if there is to be formal regulation of reservation
land-use through zoning, and if so, what the nature of that regulation
shall be. The authority of the tribes to enforce such land-use regula-
tions against all persons engaged in on-reservation conduct affecting
reservation land and resources should also be recognized.
NOTES
I. Reynolds, Zoning the Reservation-Village of Euclid Meets Agua Caliente,
2 Am. INDIAN L. REv. 1 (No. 2 1974) [hereinafter cited as Reynolds].
2. Reynolds' article does not focus on practical problems which might be en-
countered by a state in attempting to enforce a zoning ordinance on an Indian reserva-
tion. Reynolds does briefly acknowledge such practical enforcement problems: "Actual
enforcement of any land policy can often be best achieved at a local level. . . . [t]he
very distrust of state and local law, and the history behind it, argue against an applica-
tion of such law to the reservation without local participation." Id. at 11. See U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADmIN. NEws, 83d Cong., ist Sess., 2313-14 (1953) (noting the
dissatisfaction of reservation Indians over unilateral assertion of state jurisdiction over
their reservations due to mistreatment or fear of mistreatment by state law enforcement
personnel).
3- This note will assume Reynolds' definition of the term "Indian reservation,"
which limits the discussion to federal Indian reservations occupied by federally recog-
nized tribes. Reynolds' definition is taken from Healing v. Jones, zo F. Supp. 125 (D.
Ariz. 1962), aff'd per curiam, 373 U.S. 758 (1973). The Department of the Interior's
longstanding administrative distinction between "recognized" and "nonrecognized"
tribes has recently been declared an invalid basis for an Interior Department decision
not to enforce trust obligations imposed on the federal government in respect to tribal
land by 25 U.S.C § 177 and its antecedents. Joint Tribal Council of Passamaquody
Tribe v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 649 (D. Me. 1975), aff'd, 528 F.2d 370 (ist Cir. 1975).
4. Reynolds, supra note I, at II (emphasis added).
5. Id.
6. Id. at io. The statements in Reynolds' article from which this proposition is
abstracted are: (1) "Congressional legislation in 1953 gave Alaska, California, Minne-
sota, Nebraska, Oregon and Wisconsin general jurisdiction over the boundaries of
those states. Congress has now authorized all states, with tribal consent, to assume
general jurisdiction over tribes and reservations." (Footnotes omitted.) Reynolds, supra
note 1, at 3- (2) ". . . the legislation means that tribes can no longer exercise govern-
mental authority free from state supervision." Id.; (3) "It seems clear that the general
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tendency is to increase state control over reservations, and to allow within such areas
state exercise of police power except as clearly limited by statute or treaty." Id. at 4;
(4) ". . . the handwriting is on the wall; the federal government. . . is relinquishing
much of its jurisdiction and generally relinquishing it to the states, not the tribes."
Id. at 10.
7. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, 67 Stat. 588 (3953); Section 2 of the Act codified at 18
U.S.C. § 1162 (1970); Section 4 of the Act codified at 28 U.S.C. § 136o (1970).
8. Act of Apr. 11, 1963, 82 Stat. 77 (1968); Titles II, III, IV, and V of the Act
codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 130L-1303, 1311, 1312, 1321-26, 1331, 1341 (1970).
9. Henderson & Barsh, Part II, The Courts and the Indian Tribes, HARVARD LAW
SCHOOL BULLETIN, 10-15, 13 (June, 1974); Comment, State Jurisdiction over Indian
Land Use: An Interpretation of the "Encumbrance" Savings Clause of Public Law
280, 9 La D AND WATER L. REV. 421, 424-29 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Comment];
The Indian Bill of Rights and the Constitutional States of Tribal Governments, 82
HARv. L. REV. 1343 (1968).
10. Comment, supra note 9, at 424-29.
I I. Id. at 424.
12. Note, The Extension of County Jurisdiction Over Indian Reservations in Cali-
fornia: Public Law 28o and the Ninth Circuit, 25 HAsTINGs L.J. 1451, 1467 (1974).
But note that some commentators and two recent decisions have also argued that Pub.
L. 83-280 can be legitimately termed a "law and order" act designed to provide better
law enforcement on reservations. See note Io supra and note 32o infra. See also Bryan
v. Itasca County, 44 U.S.L.W. 4832 (U.S. June 14, 1976); Santa Rosa Band of
Indians v. Kings County, No. 74-1565 (9th Cir., Nov. 3, 1975)-
13. SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR ANNUAL REPORT 221 (1954).
14. H. REP. No. 848, 83 d Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1953).
15. S. REP. No. 699, 8 3 d Cong., 1st Sess., 5 (1953)-
16. H. Con. Res. No. 3o8, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953).
17. Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County, No. 74-1565, p. 12 (9 th Cir.,
Nov. 3, 1975); Note, The Extension of County Jurisdiction over Indian Reservations
in California, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 1451, 1472 (1974); Reiblich, Indian Civil Rights
under the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 1o ARiz. L. REV. 617 (1968).
I8. The jurisdiction was conferred subject to a saving clause which provides that
nothing in Pub. L. 83-280 is to be read as authorizing "the alienation, encumberance,
or taxation of Indian property." 38 U.S.C. § 1162(b) (1970); 28 U.S.C. § 1 3 6o(b)
(1970). Discussion of the significance of this clause as regards the reservation zoning
issue is infra in this note. Comparable jurisdiction was conferred on Alaska by Pub. L.
85-615, 72 Stat. 545 (1958).
19. The Red Lake Reservation of Minnesota, the Warm Springs Reservation of
Oregon, and the Menominee Reservation of Wisconsin were expressly excepted from
state jurisdiction under Pub. L. 83-280. See the note cited at supra note 12. See also 67
Stat. 588 (1953) §§ (a) and 4(a). These reservations contained the largest concen-
trations of tribal lands and the most populous tribes in these states.
The Menominee Tribe was later terminated and placed under Wisconsin jurisdic-
tion by the Act of Aug. 24, 1954, 68 Stat. 795. The Menominees regained their tribal
status and their reservation was again placed under federal jurisdiction in 1973. 25
U.S.C. §§ 90 3 (a)-90 3 (f) (1975 Supp.).
2o. 67 Stat. 588, § 2(a) and 4(a). See 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (1970); 28 U.S.C.
§ 136o(a) (1970).
21. It is not certain how many states fall into this category, as the enabling acts
and constitutions of most states are open to varying interpretations. One study lists the
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following states as having been admitted to the Union on the condition that they
disclaim jurisdiction over reservation lands: Washington, Oklahoma, Montana, North
Dakota, South Dakota, Idaho, Wyoming, Utah, New Mexico, Arizona, Alaska,
Kansas. Henderson, Indian Statehood: Reconsidered, unpublished third-year paper,
Harvard Law School (1974). (The author notes that the disclaimer is stated most
forcefully in the Kansas Enabling Act. 12 Stat. 85 (1864).)
2z. 67 Stat. 588, § 6.
23. 67 Stat. 588, § 7-
24. 82 Stat. 77, 401; 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws, p. 1865 (emphasis
added).
25. 400 U.S. 423 (1971).
26. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
27. Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423, 429 (1971): "Legislative action by
the Tribal Council does not comport with the explicit requirements of the act."
z8. Id. See McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 177 n.17 (1973).
29. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1302. This legislation was felt necessary because "the Fed-
eral Courts generally have refused to impose constitutional standards on Indian Tribal
governments, on the theory that such standards apply only to state or Federal govern-
mental action, and that Indian tribes are not states within the meaning of the 14th
Amendment." 1968 U.S. CODE CONo. & ADmIN. NEws, p. 1864. See Note, The Indian
Bill of Rights and the Constitutional Status of Tribal Governments, 8z HARv. L. REV.
1343 (1969).
3o. Lazarus, Title II of the 1968 Civil Rights Act: An Indian Bill of Rights, 45
N.D.L. REV. 337, 347-48 (1969). See note 17 supra. This interpretation lends
support to the view that Congress intended only a limited role for the federal courts
vis a vis tribal governments under ICRA-principally through the habeas corpus
provision, 25 U.S.C. § 1303, and that the federal courts have improperly asserted
jurisdiction to hear civil actions for damages claimed to arise under the Act, and have
erroneously read the Act as waiving tribal sovereign immunity from damage suits,
thereby infringing on tribal sovereignty and jeopardizing the capacity of tribes to
operate as viable governmental entities to a far greater extent than Congress intended
when enacting Pub. L. 90-284. Ziontz, In Defense of Tribal Sovereignty: An Analysis
of Judicial Error in Construction of the Indian Civil Rights Act, 20 S.D.L. REV. 1
(1975). But see De Raismes, The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 and the Pursuit of
Responsible Tribal Self-Government, 2o S.D.L. REV. 59 (1975).
31. Note, The Indian Bill of Rights and the Constitutional Status of Tribal
Governments, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1343 (1969). It should be noted that this source
contains two substantial errors. The first was directly incorporated into Reynolds' argu-
ment and the second may have influenced it. The first error is the observation that
"the following states have been given jurisdiction by Federal Statute over the reserva-
tions within their borders: Alaska, California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and
'Wisconsin.... The tribes within these states no longer exercise governmental functions
independent of the state" (emphasis added). Id. at 1343 n.z. As was pointed out
m note 19 supra the major reservations in Minnesota, Oregon, and Wisconsin were
excepted from the automatic imposition of state jurisdiction under Pub. L. 280.
The second error is an inaccurate citation identifying 67 Stat. 588 as the "Act of
August 15, 1963" (emphasis added), id. at 1343 n.z, when the correct date for 67
Stat. 588 is 1953 (see note 7 supra). This 10-year error may very well have contributed
to Reynolds' conclusion that Pub. L. 83-28o and Pub. L. 90-284 constituted a "recent"
trend in congressional termination policy as regards Indian affairs.
32. "Historically the federal government's Indian policy has fluctuated radically
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between protection of tribal existence and assimilation.... The requirement of tribal
consent for state assumption of jurisdiction, passed with the Indian Bill of Rights, 25
U.S.C.A. §§ 1321-1322 (Supp. 1969), and actions of the Committee investigating the
bill . . . show the present policy to be favorable to the preservation of tribal com-
munities as self-governing, culturally autonomous entities." Id. at 1344-45 n.8.
33. Reynolds, supra note i, at 4- The statements from which this proposition is
abstracted are: (1) ". . . to refer to tribal governments as sovereign, or even internally
sovereign, is today often misleading. Basically, the tribes' powers these days cover such
matters as form of tribal government, conditions of tribal membership, and taxation,
with at least some authority also existing as to property regulation and administration
of justice." (Footnotes omitted.) (2) "But, since the passage of 1934 legislation, a
tribe's rights of self government are only those found in a constitution approved by the
Secretary of Interior and in the corporate charter given the tribe by the Secretary."
Id. at 5- (3) ".. . any reference to tribal sovereignty can mean no more than that the
federal and state governments have delegated to the tribes certain of their powers over
land and taxation." (Footnotes omitted.) Id. (4) "The Indian Reorganization Act did
not apply to any reservation where a majority of the adult Indians voted against it.
The Navajos rejected the Act and thus enjoy less limited internal sovereignty." Id. at
13 n-36. (5) "The ordinary municipal corporation has far more freedom of action than
a tribal council under its Constitution." (Footnote omitted.) Id. at 5-
34. F. CoHEr, FEDERAL INDiAN LAW 12z (1945 ed.); Office of the Solicitor,
Federal Indian Law 395 (1966) [hereinafter cited as COHEN].
35. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) (Georgia state courts do
not have jurisdiction to punish a non-Indian for conduct within territorial jurisdiction
of Cherokee Nation; fact that Cherokee territory was within borders of state irrelevant);
55 I.D. 14, 53 n.34 (1934) -
36. Id. at 557.
37. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
38. Id. at 219.
39. Id. at 220.
40. Id. at 223.
41. 411 U.S. 164 (1973) (Arizona has no jurisdiction to impose individual income
tax on reservation Navaho Indians with respect to income wholly derived from reserva-
tion sources).
42. :18 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1886).
43. McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 175 (1973).
44. 419 U.S. 544 (1975)-
45. Id. at 557 (emphasis added).
46. The Tenth Circuit had held this delegation to be invalid on the ground that
"Congress cannot delegate its authority to a private, voluntary organization, which
is obviously not a governmental agency, to regulate a business on privately owned lands,
no matter where located." 487 F.2d 14, 19 (loth Cir. 1973).
47. Ortiz-Barraza v. United States, 512 F.2d 1176, 1179 (9 th Cir., 1975); Native
American Church v. Navajo Tribe, 272 F.2d 131, 134 (loth Cir. 1959); Iron Crow v.
Oglala Sioux Tribe, 231 F.zd 89, 94 (8th Cir. 1956).
48. Mundt, Indian Autonomy and Indian Legal Problems, 15 KAN. L. REV. 505
(1967) [hereinafter cited as Mundt]; Schaab, Indian Industrial Development and the
Courts, 8 NATURAL RESOURCE J. 303 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Schaab]; Oliver,
Legal Status of American Indian Tribes, 38 ORE. L. REV. 193, 225-26 (1959) [herein-
after cited as Oliver].
49. 419 U.S. 544 (1975)- See note 46 supra.
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50. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79 (1970).
51. Reynolds' suggestion that tribal powers are powers delegated by the federal
government has some support. See 18 U.S.C. § 1161, upheld in United States v.
Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975), but only with respect to express delegations of specific
federal powers by Congress to tribes. The suggestion that tribal powers may be con-
sidered as delegated by states has absolutely no foundation, e.g., McClanahan v.
Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
52. See note 32 supra.
53. Oliver, supra note 48, at 225, states that "[the] Courts have ordinarily, if not
uniformly, proceeded upon the recognition of an unextinguished 'limited sovereignty,'"
and he quotes Cohen for the proposition that "those powers which are lawfully vested
in an Indian tribe are not, in general, delegated powers granted by express acts of
Congress, but rather inherent powers of a limited sovereignty which has never been
extinguished." Oliver does go on to suggest that the restrictions on tribal government
action imposed by "Federal powers over the tribe" make "tribal sovereignty seem ... a
fantasy." Id. at 232. But he never disavows the basic notion of tribal government
sovereignty as described by Cohen.
54. Mundt, supra note 48, at 5o5, offers Reynolds even less support. Mundt quotes
with approval the same passage from COHEN which I have cited to note 34 supra
(describing the basic framework of tribal government sovereignty). Mundt then states,
"[T]hus residual jurisdiction appears to lie in the tribal courts based on the sovereignty
of tribes" (emphasis added). Id. at 506. At no point does Mundt suggest that tribes
do not retain their inherent powers of sovereignty.
55- 419 U.S. 544 (1975).
56. Henderson & Marsh, Part II, The Courts and the Indian Tribes, HARVARD LAW
SCHOOL BULLETIN, 30-15, 12 (June, 1974).
57" Schaab, supra note 48, at 311 n.29.
58. Reynolds, supra note 1, at 5.
59. Id.
6o. 55 I.D. 14 (1934). Schaab's suggestion, to the contrary, must give way to the
language of the statute. Schaab, supra note 48, at 311-12.
61. See discussion on such tribes and the various types of governmental structures
and charters which they had in FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 408 (1966).
62. There is some evidence to suggest that current Interior policy as to the scope of
Secretarial approval power regarding resolutions and ordinances adopted by IRA (and
non-IRA) tribes is limited to the question of whether the action sought to be taken by
the tribe is consistent with federal law, and that in most cases, such "approval" follows
as a matter of course once this threshold question is answered in the affirmative. See
55 I.D. 14,15, 1955 (1934). See also Oliver v. Udall, 306 F.zd 819 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
It is undoubtedly true that for IRA (and non-IRA) tribes where tribal leadership
has not been sufficiently forceful or sophisticated, or where the political and economic
stakes and pressures brought to bear on the Interior Department are unusually high,
e.g., as in respect to issues regarding control of water or mineral resources on and
adjacent to western reservations, the scope of federal "approval" authority exercised
by the Bureau of Indian Affairs has often (if not systematically) exceeded that de-
scribed above. See Note, The Indian: The Forgotten American, 81 HARV. L. REV.
1818, 1824 (1968); THE NAVAJO NATION: AN AmERICAN COLONY: A RE'ORT OF
THE UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, 9 (Sept. 1975). However, in three
years (1971-.974) as Planning Coordinator for the Tribal Council, Mississippi Band
of Choctaw Indians (a tribe not recognized prior to its organization under IRA in
1945), the author of this note did not observe a single instance out of hundreds of
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol4/iss1/11
tribal council actions--including a resolution to remove the local non-Indian BIA
Superintendent-being vetoed by the Secretary of the Interior. (The Superintendent
was removed and replaced with a Mississippi Choctaw selected by the Tribal Council.)
The strong Choctaw tribal government to which the above observations attest is in
large part attributable to Philip Martin, former Choctaw Tribal Chairman (1959-1966,
1971-1975), and his undeviating commitment to substituting tribal control for federal
management of the Choctaw Reservation. See ACCELERATED PROGRESS THROUGH
SELF-DErERM)INATION, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CHOCTAV SELF-DETERMINA-
TION REPORT, Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians (197z). The Mississippi Choctaws
are now fighting for their survival as a tribe and for their retention of "trust status" land
in litigation arising from an attempt by the state of Mississippi to assert control over
the Choctaw Reservation through the imposition of state taxes on reservation activities
by the tribal construction company. United States v. Mississippi Tax Comm'n, 505
F.zd 633 (5th Cir. 1974), judgment vacated, Apr. 11, 1975, reh. denied, July 19, 1976.
63. Reynolds supra note I, at 5.
64. =5 U.S.C. § 476 (1970).
65" 25 U.S.C. § 4 7 7 (1970).
66. See FAY, OCCASIONAL PUBLICATIONS IN ANTHROPOLOGY. Charters and Bylaws
of Indian Tribes of North America, part I-X (1970).
67. Reynolds, supra note 1, at 5 n-36.
68. See Fay, supra note 66. The Seminole Tribe of Florida is one such tribe. See
Maryland Cas. Co. v. Citizen's Nat'l Bank, 361 F.2d 517 ( 5th Cir. 1966).
69. 55 I.D. 14, 28 (1934).
70. Kline v. City of Harrisburg, 362 Pa. 438, 68 A.2d 182 (1949) (in the absence
of the granting of specific power from the legislature municipalities do not have the
authority to pass zoning ordinances). See Robertson v. Montgomery, z85 A. 421, 233
So. 2d 69 (Ala. 1970).
71. E.g. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975)-
72. See, e.g., Navajo Tribal Code, 14 N.T.C. § .21; 36 N.T.C. § 2ol. See 78 I.D.
229 (1971) (Indian tribes have police power jurisdiction to prohibit aerial crop
spraying within the confines of a reservation). See also § 298, The Land Use Planning
Act of 1973, adopted by Senate June 21, 1973, 93d Congress, 1st Sess. (incorporating
recognition of authority of tribal governments to regulate reservation land use).
73. 404 F. Supp. 1338, 1341 (D.S.D. 1975).
74. Reynolds, supra note 1, at 9.
75. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959), cited at note 37 supra and accompany-
ing text.
76. Olliphant v. Schlie, Cause No. 511-7362 (D. Wash., decided Jan. 25, 1974),
appeal docketed No. C. H. 74-2 154, 9 th Cir. 1974) ) (Suquamish Tribe may arrest and
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